

## POLITICAL DIANETICS

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*During January 1951, when this lecture was transcribed by a Foundation staff member, there was a project under way to compile a Dianetics text on specialised applications in industry, management and government. Possibly this lecture was originally intended to be included in that book.*

*Unfortunately the transcription of this lecture was never completed; neither was the book.*

*This transcript is presented here as a part of the record of research on Group Dianetics. No actual recording of the lecture has been located with which to verify the transcription.*

### Difficulties of Government

There is a lot to the subject of Political Dianetics. It is difficult to talk about a government as of today and a government as one should be, because to talk about a government as it should be, one would necessarily have to include something that is right.

Politics is not the art of collecting an office away from the people. It is a science of organising the society of a nation on a governing level.

The first thing we have to know about this is the analogy which can be drawn between an organism and the social organism. There is a definite parallel between the two.

I have been struck many times by the arguments which come into being the moment one begins to speak of Political Dianetics. People immediately name some superaberrated action that is going forward at the moment, and then they say, "Well, how do you solve that?" This is wonderful, because here is a problem that has been in existence for thousands of years as a social error, and now it is demanded that one produce a solution to this error which of course has no solution.

The problem is actually that there is merely a chaotic situation stemming from a complete lack of organisation or understanding, and one is supposed to reach into this horrible mass of tangled political red tape and somehow or other just pick up the right end and everything will be all right.

This is talking in terms of adjusting current government. We can do some of that but it is not a good solution, though it will have to be done that way. Let me put it this way: Revolutions produce, unfortunately, the same article in an altered form. For instance, the French revolted against aristocracy and then they got Napoleon. As we look over the evolution of social bodies, we find a sort of defeatist philosophy running through the whole line of politics to the effect that "no matter how much things seem to change they always remain the same." That is not true. However, when the revolutionaries stand the governing people up against the wall and shoot them all dead, they may change some of the mores or some of the customs, and they certainly change the names on the doors of the political offices, but they change practically nothing inside those offices.

Russia today is a czarist bureaucracy. If you look over the form of the czarist bureaucracy the way it had evolved just prior to the revolution, you will find that that czarist bureaucracy had very definite working lines. It was a bureaucracy with a capital B! It was fantastic the number of people they could get to handle one piece of paper, and it was fabulous how they could run one whole operation without fixing the responsibility on any one individual. They had devised a system which was irresponsible, a system which did not bleed, which you could not take out and shoot, which you could not do anything about. This system was the government

of Russia. The czar and the archdukes and duchesses and so on were all sort of caught up in this system.

Then a bunch of revolutionaries came along and said, "Tomorrow we eat strawberries." Their whole situation revolved around putting the czar, archdukes and duchesses up against the wall and shooting them dead. That was fine, but they forgot to shoot the system. It was not shootable. As a result, when they had finished up their great revolution, people were not eating strawberries, they were eating the bureaucracy which strangled Russia under the czar.

They have Stalin now, not Nicholas Alexander. They have about as many people now in slave camps as the czar had in Siberia. They have a subway where no trains run, but beyond that very little progress is seen.

The funny part of it is they have an ideology. This ideology runs outside the borders and goes racing across the face of the earth. There are communist nations right now outside the boundaries of Russia. But Russia is not a communist nation; it is an absolute monarchy and it has all these ills within it.

Of course, they say these ills come along by contagion, from mother to child, and they feel that if they could stop that contagion they could evolve, which they have been trying to do since the revolution in 1917.

The peaceful evolution of political form gains certain, definite ends. With Dianetics, Russia could cut off this contagion between Papa, Mama and child, and as soon as that contagion down through the generations was cut, then perhaps they could evolve. But until they cut that they will not be able to.

Russia, at first glance, might be thought to be using Dianetics along certain lines with certain goals, you might say, which were proposed here in this country—that is, using Dianetics to make people more amenable. However, if one uses it for control it backfires, just as a revolution always backfires; but it would probably break the chain of contagion down through the generations. It will do much more than that, of course. But that is one thing for which Russia has been hunting a solution ever since her people found out they were still a czarist state after the revolution. Somewhere they have got to say "That was, and now this is." Until they do they are still in that "no matter how much things change they always remain the same."

To change the thinking, customs, personal habits and politics of a large body of people is a very difficult thing. It is difficult because politics and mores and so on get into the engram bank. Then, as part of the reactive mind, they are unchangeable. You can't argue with this person, all you can do is push his buttons. So, unable to argue with him by reason, one has to handle him by force.

We picked up in Educational Dianetics that the amount of force necessary increases in direct ratio to the lack of reason. That is to say, the more irrational a thing is, the more force one has to use against it. So we have irrational populaces throughout the country, and they are today mainly governed by force and custom and so on, and seldom by reason.

The political body of the nation, any nation, can be likened to an organism. It has a certain life span; it has an infancy, a youth, an old age and a death. It increases in its general knowledge educationally throughout this course, and it collects, within itself, engrams.

Now, there are many engrams in the social body. It is a little difficult to locate them unless one has a good eye for engrams. There are certain things which form contagion points in a society—command points—which impinge on the consciousness of the society and demand action. And the society responds to those points irrationally.

I am very loath, by the way, to start naming these points of contagion within American society. I could even take the Roman society, but right away I would be stepping on the toes of Christianity. You can see the position one gets into immediately, because in order to talk about this thing, he suddenly comes up against this same set of reactions.

Something has been announced as good and worthwhile and necessary. We look it over carefully in the light of Dianetics and find out it is promulgating data which is highly destructive to the society at large, but we can't touch it because, like an engram, it is very definitely part of the organism. It's like somebody who has one of these "can't get rid of it" engrams—"I just don't dare get rid of it, I'd die, I'd lose my mind"—where Mama is talking about her unborn child. We don't know quite what the contagion points of society are talking about. They are locked in antipathy, and at the present moment no excellent way of erasing the social organism's engrams is at hand because the social body at large favors them a great deal. Society is not accessible. I point out that this is particularly true of psychotics.

This whole problem, then, revolves around this single analogy of the society as an organism, and when we have an understanding of this analogy, we can go forward and do something about the society at large. But we do not have at this moment, as I say, a good way of erasing the society's engrams. When I say a good way, I mean we don't have a good way of achieving accessibility; we do have a method of doing it once we have accessibility.

To go out and shoot people is not a good way. In the Spanish Civil War, for instance, the citizens of Spain had looked around and seen that most of the arable land of Spain was under church ownership, they saw that taxes were very high, that the king and government had stolen things and so on, until the populace at large did not have anything. Nobody was in there with a good corn-and-games philosophy, so the society erupted. People were hungry. They were sure the monarchy line and the republican regime were destructive to society, and they decided that the Catholic church was an infection in the society because it owned so much land, so they decided to wipe those things out.

The populace had decided that they didn't have any way of reforming them; they had somehow or other lost communication with the church and the church in that particular area seemed to have lost communication with them. So we had the spectacle of people pouring gasoline over the heads of men and igniting their hair, and having them flee down the steps of churches, and of bodies of priests stacked like firewood, with the match touched to them—the most horrible atrocities imaginable.

That was a revolution Spain happens to have lost, but she would have lost the war in any event. She would have had to put back in place something approximating what she had destroyed. She had purged everything, and in the parlance of the old fellows, nature abhors a vacuum.

However, "Nature abhors a vacuum" is wrong; what actually happens is that pressure from the outside fills up the hole. Something is missing in this social organism, so something will go in and fill it up. It might be that the "Commission for Holding Church Lands for the State Prior to Their Redistribution to the Peasantry" (this might be the title of the office) without giving the people any spiritual protection, without giving them any benefits of the church whatsoever, would proceed to realize at that moment that they were able to extract from this particular post exactly what had been extracted before, which is to say, the total revenue. And a few years would go by and the people would still be walking around in the streets hungry.

There are a lot less people now—a lot of them are dead—but they have solved the starvation problem to some degree. I have been told that this is not an effective solution.

That solution is wrong. An engram is violence of some sort or other, and here is an actual violent wiping-out of something. It is not an erasure. It is just the formation of a new engram, an engramic lock on a chain of errors. A new error is put into the chain of errors, so now we have an engramic lock in the society.

What happens more precisely in the society is this: Let's take Spain and the Catholic church. They had people within their own ranks who were brought up to be good Catholics. There is nothing wrong with being brought up to be a good Catholic. What was wrong in their cases was where they crossed the fence and tried to be good revolutionaries and good Catholics simultaneously.

The people would follow just so far along this course and then naturally they would revolt against the people who were revolting, and we would have a situation like the French Revolution with Robespierre, Danton and so on—a concatenation of death. People are not satisfied, so we get violence upon violence. It's not correct technically to say that one who lives by the sword dies by the sword, but it is correct to say that one who creates engrams gets them. It's a backfire.

The Catholic church, revolted against, would try again to pick itself up; because even if its properties were destroyed, even if its personnel were destroyed in that area, it would still have people devoted enough to it to go in and carry on. These people would then be outraged by what had happened and they would decide to defend instead of attack.

There is always the situation of a certain segment of the population being out for the underdog philosophy—actually this is projection into the losing valence—so they decide to make a losing valence a winning valence in other people. And it goes just so far before you get this type of revolt.

They thought, "Let's kill the priests. This is the way to cleanse the whole society." But they overlooked one fact: those priests have friends; they have personal friends. Furthermore, an act of violence is thrown in there which makes people understand that people are not very valuable. The status of human beings has been stepped down. The second that is stepped down, then the revolution will sweep forward; the status of other human beings is stepped down lower and lower, and life gets very cheap.

When people realize this they try to stop the tide, and the only way they can stop the tide is to throw back into existence the machinery which existed before the slaughter.

So we start out with a society at this level, revolution, and it goes on a dwindling spiral. You cannot win on something like that; it always deteriorates.

For example, in Russia today, a man called Ivan, who has not done any harm in his life to anybody in the neighborhood, disappears one night. No one ever hears of him again. The only trouble is, Ivan had friends. They might be festering and depressed and feel it is as much as their life is worth to protest against it. They might be told and might even be led to believe that Ivan was a peril to the state. But there will be too many Ivans, and gradually people one after the other become alienated from the central government. Then they will revolt. And today Russia spends a lot of time and blood on counterrevolution. That is their big bugaboo—counterrevolution.

If you hurt too many people in the society and you hurt their friends, the first thing you know, the ones who have done the hurting are in the minority. By contagion these pains go out and revolt the society against the individual, group or party which created the pain.

This cycle will go back and forth and all of a sudden people realize they have gotten into a descending spiral, a series of key-ins and new engramic locks. They have got to stop this spiral someplace. If they don't, of course, the whole society just perishes, and has many times in the past perished from this cycle.

Spain, for instance, was a great and gaudy nation once. She controlled the Indies and her fleets controlled the world. And then in 1898 a couple of the lousiest ships I ever looked at in my life just shot her to pieces as far as a navy was concerned. She had been going downhill

through these contagions for a long time, and she has wiped herself out in this last civil war. She will never again be a world power or anything. That is a bunch of people who are pretty badly licked.

They still have the political philosophy, by the way. They are all pepped up now to be an anarchy. You can't have an anarchistic society, by the way, until you have people in it who are sane. She is really biting off a tough bullet there, trying to reach the impossible. We might be able to give her weapons so she could pull out of it. But here is this great nation which by spreading force got force—new engrams; it is on a dwindling spiral.

Here is the problem of the consecutive leaders of the French Revolution. Each one was killed in turn by the people he had antagonised by his sword. That is the dictation of force.

One starts to use force against reason and one produces unreason, and then unreason produces more unreason, which calls for more force, which, leveled against unreason, makes even greater unreason. And so we go down the dwindling spiral to where we get just one hundred percent force. Such a cycle winds up in whatever the reverse of optimum is. It winds up in the idea of the government being one hundred percent composed of bayonet units and the populace being one hundred percent enclosed in barbed wire. So that is the bottom of the cycle, unless the society just falls apart on the way down and is taken over by some other society—which is usually what happens.

But that would be the bottom of the rung, like in the income tax bureau today. The “optimum” they are working toward is one collector for one taxpayer. But the other “optimum” would be one soldier per citizen.

This is the organism, the working organism of society, as it exists today. There is a process at work here which is called the introduction of the arbitrary. It is most pertinent in Political Dianetics. One finds this sort of a process going on in the government: Something is wrong in the government. Someone looks it over and does not appreciate its fundamental error but only sees the erroneous effect. He does not see any cause there, he sees just effect; for instance, “The country is going broke; let's print more money”—that sort of a solution. That would be an arbitrary solution, the solution which is based not upon reason but upon one's desire to force the course of circumstances into a more proper path.

Now, it is all very well to use force occasionally, if you want to change the course of rivers and when you want to move mountains; these objects respond to force. But force applied against them without reason is very bad. We have to be very smart when we want to move a mountain. If we try, we can even make the stream and the mountain move themselves, if the engineer is bright enough. The less reason is used, the harder the job is going to be, and the more the project is going to be messed up.

So here we have a problem. The country is going broke. Somebody says, “The country is going broke. That means we haven't got enough money; let's print more money.” They go down and knock out some plates—twenty billion, eighty billion, a hundred billion—it's fantastic. It is also rather heartbreaking to me.

I received some stamps the other day from a little guy I knew in China; he has been a friend of mine for a long time. He ran a series of shops, and once in a while I used to get some colored amber from him and write him a letter and ask him how things were and so on, and he could always be counted on to send me what I wanted or handle any little legal affairs that came up in that part of the world.

Then the Japanese swallowed him up, and now the Reds have swallowed him up, and I had not heard from him since the Reds got there. But I received an airmail letter from him recently, and it had on it as postage from printed stamps 425,000 Chinese dollars. I wrote him and put in an American dollar bill to make sure he had something with which to buy postage. And I got another airmail letter from him after only two months had elapsed, and there was

\$8,625,000 in stamps on that letter. A little more time went by and I got another letter from him; on that one was \$16,000,000—just round figures. They didn't worry about the odd pennies. That was the equivalent of twenty-five cents postage! But something interesting had happened. The second set of stamps had actually been published, but the third set of stamps were any old stamps you could lay your hands on in the stamp office, with a rubber stamp put over the top of these, saying their value had been changed to this new figure. They changed so fast that the government did not have time to print; they only had time to alter the rubber stamp. And I don't know what a letter would cost over there now.

I imagine that under Red economics something is going to happen in that area. I think the communists may have ruined the economics throughout China in order to make this push. That would be about the smartest trick a person could do—to go over and bomb people with money!

We are very dull on this Korean War situation. It's a concatenation of stupidity. If we went up into North Korea or North China and bombed them every time they sent a group in there, we would toughen up the resistance: "Look, Americans are dangerous. You're going to get killed if you keep playing ball with America. You'd better fight, you'd better arm, you'd better do exactly what the commissar says." But if you went in there and bombed them with money, big bales of their own currency beautifully printed, very valid, and kept right up to the minute on any changes made in the printing by intelligence services (because we can print faster than they can—we have better equipment), eventually nobody would work for anybody. If one has to indulge in war, that is the way to fight war.

I think all these generals were indoctrinated in their early youth by Tom Mix,<sup>1</sup> because they're only thinking of war in terms of bullets, and there is nothing in the world more liable to backfire than a bullet. Furthermore, the tonnage of the number of bullets required in a war to kill a man has run way up. In the Civil War it took ten pounds of lead to kill somebody, and then in World War I it got up to five hundred fifty pounds. By World War II it took about sixty tons to kill somebody. It is very ineffective. They haven't got it down to a good solid working basis when it comes to bullets. They are doing better with the atom bomb; it's more "efficient." There is just that one thing, however: we are killing men, and that is not what we should be trying to do. It is all synthesized down to where nobody quite has a definition of what a war is supposed to be, so nobody does anything about it and the war is chaos. Chaos spreads fast and new engrams come out of it; it's a mess.

Right now our economics are being ruined by Soviet Russia in a very ingenious way. Soviet Russia got the idea of ruining economics. They have got us up to the point where we are going to stay armed.

Now, that means that they start a little war in Korea, which we will probably win. (I hope so. I would not know what to do to go down and see a North Korean in the White House.) The Truman administration has decided they are going to prosecute something like a war. They sent in some marines and the army sent a lot of soft, untrained occupation troops, and the navy is still in mothballs.

Anyway, Russia gets us all stirred up, and down in the White House they say we have got to have more men in the army—that solves everything. "Got to have more men, got to have more taxes, got to do this, got to do everything but think—and the whole situation will resolve"; but it never does. If Soviet Russia can just make us keep three million men under arms and our mothball fleet at sea and manned, they will shoot up our economics and we will no longer be a capitalist nation. In fact, I don't think we are at this minute. This last war almost destroyed our economic system; people don't realize how close it came to destruction. If Russia can keep us under solid arms for about three years, this government is going to go bankrupt. It is in a bad way.

It won't really go bankrupt; we will walk into a central banking system, and after a while if the situation doesn't get better and somebody doesn't get very inventive, somebody will be

taking a rubber stamp and stamping our letters in the post office. They will say, "That's \$4,000,000 for this three-cent stamp," and then they will give you a two-cent stamp that only says \$250,000 on it, and they will say, "Well, the value of that has been upped." That is what would happen with central banking, and the next step after that is the totalitarian economic system where the state owns everything. So Russia is going to make Us into a communist nation, or bust us trying, or both.

Whether we follow communism or not, communism really intends to take complete control. And after an economic system goes completely to pot, what is left but the state to take control? So you have a state-controlled economy, and that is the same as communism. Socialism comes in there somewhere.

We will still call ourselves a democracy, probably, and go out and fight to save the world for democracy again, but it won't be quite the same thing. That is just a matter of changing the label.

This is not invective I am giving you; I am giving you the introduction of the arbitrary. There is the problem: the money is not very valuable. What is the solution? They put in an arbitrary solution and pass a law that money is valuable. The only trouble is that there is a natural law in economics right under that, and it says that when there is nothing for money to buy, the money isn't valuable. But they just ignore this and pass a law saying money is valuable and that you will have to accept it as legal tender for your debts.

A little bit further on, they find out this is not working, so the next law they pass is to regulate the people who are regulating the law with regard to the money. That is the introduction of the new arbitrary. It is a nonessential arbitrary; it is a new law that goes in to counter the bad effects of the old law.

Governments have a tendency toward never analyzing a situation, but finding something is going wrong and then passing a law or creating a new law to block this. Then they find out that the new law has created two new errors, so they have to block those; and then they have got eight new errors, so they block those rapidly, but each of those when blocked does a split. It is like electrons hitting a plate, giving a dispersal effect, and each time there is a dispersal they put a new plate in front of it, and from this a new stream of electrons comes out and they of course get a new dispersal, so they have to put in new plates.

The first thing you know, you have an optimum government ratio of one government employee per citizen, and this breaks down to where you have one government employee everywhere you have a citizen and government employee and citizen are synonyms. The arbitraries are up to a point where nobody can possibly take care of the situation. Occasionally a government will make a sensible move, and they will get someone in and have him reorganize the whole government. This was done in the United States by Herbert Hoover in 1947. The government called in some people, and they looked over the situation for a while, had a lot of conferences, and then sat down and reorganised the executive branch of the government, only they didn't have much latitude to work with. That is the Hoover report.

It is an organisational plan, and it is based on the real situation to a point where it will have fewer arbitraries than it had before. All it is trying to do is cut out some of the introduced arbitraries. If you cut out some of the arbitraries, the whole organisation will limp along for a while, up to the point where somebody introduces some new arbitraries, and then it starts all over.

But it takes essential organisational planning and a full knowledge of the various laws of politics which exist to do a reorganization. We can't blame the people too much because they did not know the laws. There are a lot of organizations in the country, though, who have made a very careful study of economics, made a very careful study of the natural laws in general, and have stayed pretty close to center.

The economic policies and so on which we are using today are mostly from a fellow by the name of Hitler. He reformed the devil out of our governmental economy; they had a new type of arbitrary law to introduce. You will find more signs of Hitlerian influence in the American government today than you will find anything else, if you look. We borrowed a very great deal from Germany. We were borrowing from Germany a little bit before the war, and during the war we even had to put in some of their measures. For instance, our economic blockade system which was used during the war was one hundred percent lifted from Hitler's ideas. We are still using that kind of blockade. We are trying to jockey now on the world market using this same law.

I am not too cognizant of the economic activities of the government at the present time. They don't suit me very well at times. It is information which you can almost do without.

At one time we had a government based on the theory of rugged individualism. Then somebody came along and said, "This is a capitalism." Then somebody else said, "Well, this is capitalism all right: It's a republic, and a republic should run along these lines. And since capitalism always leans toward slight socialism because we've got to take care of . . ." and it has gone off along that line. We now have a sort of social democracy which is running as a republic—a more or less democratic system of government which is inclining to an absolute monarchy.

England, for instance, is a monarchy reigning as a socialism.

These are beautiful ideologies; however, I doubt today if there is a pure ideology anywhere in the world. They have put big labels on these things, and when you pick up the corner of the sign and look you might find almost anything. It's like the soup they make in New Orleans—it might have almost anything in it.

There is no definite ideology which is working out along the lines on which it was intended to work in the world today, because governments have another theory—the theory of compromise. "Let's figure out what he wants and what we want, and we'll give him half of what he wants and he'll give us half of what we want." This is an operating system which will operate for days without busting down!

By the way, I know whereof I speak in regard to bills and legislation and the mechanisms and central working mechanics of our government. I went to school in Washington, D.C., and I had a lot of friends up on the Hills during the next few years, and during 1941 I decided to push a button. A friend of mine (a public-relations man from the Pacific Northwest) and I were sitting over coffee and we decided the government was too calm. We decided we would push a button and see what happened.

There was an outfit known as the Army Air Corps, and there was a lot of pressure to make it into a separate department of air forces like England had. We decided the air force needed an autonomous status. The representative from Massachusetts had been talking about this as part of his press campaign for some time.

So here we were, a writer and a public-relations man. We walked into the third floor of the government office building, and we had connections but didn't want anything.

That's how government becomes complicated—by wanting something out of it. You can do almost anything you want with government if you don't want anything, because you just have no classification. Nobody can classify you, and as a result everybody just walks around and is glad to meet you because you are not asking any favors. And this is so strange that it gives you quite a bit of "pep" (that means publicity, within the cliques that work with the cliques).

We pushed the button on Monday and the autonomous status of the United States Air Force happened on Tuesday. We did it as a little experiment. We didn't care whether the United

States Air Force was flying helicopters or digging holes. It was just a point that there was sentiment existing on in some lines. All we had to do was go down and write a bill requesting what we wanted. We merely said, "Senator Philipsenbalm just sent us down to write up these bills; he's quite interested in it." As a matter of fact the senator had muttered something like that the night before; it was rather indistinct because of Scotch, but he had. We went over to the House of Representatives and wrote a bill. Then we sent an alarm report that this bill was going through to tear the air force away from the army and the navy and to set up a new department.

So of course this just went along by word of mouth. It was wonderful! Senator's office after senator's office was alerted by the army and the navy, because the army and navy have patrons up on the Hill; they are not orphans. Finally we had collected a long series of names of people who were alarmed that this was going to happen. Then we told them something worse was going to happen—the air force would be set up as an independent department of defence. Then all we had to do was to tell the fellow who was a press relations man for the secretary of war, "Look, boy! You'd better get on the ball because this and this and this."

"Huh! I'll see the secretary immediately!"

Autonomous status for the United States Air Force was created. That is how it happened. You think this sounds too incredible, that a government could be so loose, so poorly controlled, so utterly unplanned, that anyone could just walk into the center of this government and do something like that. This government today is not very stable. I wish it were more stable.

Mind you, I happen to be a loyal American, I happen to be for the American people and I definitely enjoy our old friend Jefferson and the rest of them. It is just that occasionally I don't enjoy seeing these things departed from too far. Even Jefferson's statement that a government ought to be reorganized completely every twenty-five years doesn't throw aside the fact that he was a pretty loyal American. I think there are people who will agree with the statement that he was a loyal American.

Suppose I had been an agent provocateur from Moscow or Italy or Germany; it wouldn't have made any difference. I would have had the same connections and could have done the same thing. And suppose the point wasn't quite as innocent, and a similar job had been done just before the war by this infiltration process, which prevented all the navy yards from getting machine tools to build battleships in case we went to war with Germany.

In other words, we don't seem to have a good organisational plan going. We look for the people who are in charge and for the people who are doing the planning and so on, and we find some guy who is sitting out doing nothing much but pushing a few buttons and getting compromises, and occasionally jockeying something around or getting his boss a contract (because his boss is also the vice president of some manufacturing company). It's pretty loose.

But we have, over all this, this huge illusion of terrific planning. We have the illusion of an organisation, we have an illusion that this country is held together today by a great democracy. It is being held together less and less by that. Actually this country is held together by the loyalty and ability of its individual citizens who form the social organism, not by a bloodless outfit such as those I described to you.

It is held together because in our minds we have this idea; we have an idea of what we want out of our government, that this is the kind of government we want and we hope that we have got. But now all the government has to do is keep convincing us that we have got it and things are running that way and they will go on running that way.

If we, for instance, as a body, overthrew the United States Government by force, we would catalyze the defeat of the American people. Any government overthrown by force decays and deteriorates the social organism. But we as a people are on the wrong side of the evolution

slope. We are not evolving very fast toward a higher plane of government. We have new factors of communication and transportation; these things are very swift. But they are not being integrated into our central government. It is up to Us, not to an organisation.

What happened when the Russians shot the czar? They shot a lot of people but they didn't shoot the organization; they couldn't.

Today we are not in any kind of position to shoot an organisation. Nobody is at fault at this because nobody has done any planning. Anybody, by the way, who wants to cast this as a real organisational problem is certainly welcome to it. My whole point here has not been one that preaches the fact that the United States Government is lacking utterly in force, but only that we are in a situation where the individual is being convinced he should adjust to the society.

No more dangerous principle than "You must adjust to the society" could ever be flung forth, that a person as an individual unit has no force to alter or change or make progressive any form of government which we have today: city, county, state—it doesn't matter. We are told that our votes really don't count.

The franchise, for instance, is not too good; we all have franchises to vote. They are sort of handed out like confetti. The qualifications for the voters are very minor. All of these things need some reformation, because the power of any organism is merely the power of these individual units. It is not the power of the state.

All this is directed toward discouraging a blind belief in a great entity which exists, because the entity doesn't exist. For instance, you and I could get together and we could figure out a government. After we had figured out this government, we could say, "Well, this is the way it should run." Finally, tomorrow, we could figure out another organisational plan. We could keep altering this thing, setting up its ideals and procedures, because people cannot be frozen in their line of thought. We could get one of these things going and then everybody would start to believe in it.

It only depends on how well you can think, how much we know of natural laws behind politics. Those things are important. The forms that governments take are not. The form that a government takes ultimately should only be limited by whether it is efficient, and whether it serves the nation, conserves its natural resources, and gives to the citizens the utmost in wealth of living. We need an outfit that will do that. We don't have to call it a government.

The United States Government has picked up for itself certain symbols. These symbols are supposed to represent something. They still represent those things, but what is done under those symbols by groups of men who are not planning for the future? We are intimately concerned with what happens under the symbol, not with the symbol itself.

A government which fails, fails because of that: too much attention is paid to the symbol and too little attention is paid to the efficiency of the whole problem. The United States Government could probably be run today with all its functions by one-twentieth of the people it has, and it is not performing enough functions for the citizenry right this minute.

It is an absolute disgrace that there aren't four transcontinental highways. All during the 1930s we had men out of work. We had everything else but no highways. For instance, if any of you have driven over Highway 66, you will have seen that it's a cowpath. Somebody was certainly asleep at the switch there.

The function of the government is not to serve, but to operate as a crew of servants, you might say. We keep setting governments up as unities and make them separate from flesh and blood. And every time we set up one of these things, people set up channels inside the thing so that no human being is responsible—it's just papers. Papers chase themselves more and more, and then there is an outfit that sets up and tries to introduce new arbitraries, all trying to solve the old problems.

But the planning is yours to do, not really the legislature's. You are supposed to get an idea once in a while. They don't have any ideas, the poor guys; I feel sorry for them.

They sit around and they say, "Well, how do we solve this proposition?" There is a need here, and somebody gets a happy thought and says, "Well, let's appoint Senator Bumbuob who lost his teeth last session; he's still a friend of ours. Let's appoint him to a commission and let him study this thing." The commission sits around for a while and they come up with an idea that maybe so-and-so. But then this commission has to compromise with another commission, and then there are certain interests over here that have to be protected, like someone sitting here in the middle who had an office all this time that employed 128 people—"Well, he has got to maintain that office. After all, that's his job, because if we lower the number of employees in that office we would have to lower his salary. We wouldn't want to do that to Joe!"

So they look around them and all of a sudden they get messed up in the fact that no one has done any central planning, and they are not permitted to do any executive planning, really, and the next thing you know these fellows are sent off chasing this and that, and they start organizing.

But any two of them will get together and agree that everybody on the Hill is a boob. Yet if they know what they are doing and they are trying to do it, these men are not selfish and they are able. I have been up there many times.

I am really cognizant of the fact that the liberty of the mass and its continued independence from a totalitarian rule depends very, very much on the continued independence of the Senate and the House of Representatives—in other words, the representation. The aim of every president who goes in is to get these boys aligned in the sort of ways he wants them to vote. They say this is an efficient administration. I noticed, for instance, when Truman wanted to take control of everything in 1946 that the House and Senate said no. And he had at that time about all the political control you could level at a set of people, and they still said no.

If anybody is getting his political engram stepped on, I'm sorry.